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INFLUENCE FROM THE SHADOWS: THE OECD, THE SHAPE
OF DOMESTIC TAX POLICY AND LESSONS FOR FEDERAL
SYSTEMS
by Duncan Bentley'
Over the years, the OECD has quietly taken centre stage in international tax policy
development. The influence of the OECD is evident in the shape of Australian international tax
policy. More recently, Australia has discovered that it can, in turn, have some influence in the:
direction taken by the OECD. This article examines some aspects of these influences. At a:
different level, the federaVstnte relationship is becoming tenser in the face of increasing taXi
competition. The second part of this article explores whether there ..., any lessons for federall
tax systems that can be drawn from the way the OECD and similar organizations have helped!
the development of international tax policy. It is argued that an independent facilitator of tax'
policy, legislation and administration may prove beneficial. i
All the world's a stage,
And all the men and women merely players:
They have their exits and their entrances;
And one man in his time plays many parts ...
Shakespeare, As You Like It II.vii.139
Introduction
The Economist recently reported that, 'The official Bush agenda has been to promote
trade at the global, regional and bilateral level simultaneously." This reflects the state
of world affairs. Interaction between players on the world stage has always been
complex. Machiavelli explored the complexities in the art of statecraft in The Prince.
Recently, the complexity has been exacerbated by the exponential growth in
communication and technology. This is illustrated by the transmission of the conduct
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INFLUENCE FROM THE SHADOWS
The inter-connectedness of different participants in the conduct of world affairs
remains the same. However, at all levels of policy development the number and
range of stakeholders, influencers and participants has expanded with increased
access. Protesters against globalisation, soccer hoodlums and supporters of Or
Howard Dean, a 2004 Democratic contender for the US presidential election, have all
used the internet effectively for widely different causes. Although taxation can attract
as much public attention when the question is whether to impose a poll tax, a goods
and services tax or cut significantly the top marginal rates of income tax, the public
attention waivers as discussion turns to technical detail.
It is in the exploration of that technical detail by policy makers, legislators, the
executive and the judiciary that the ready access to a wide range of instant
information, communication and influence has the potential to change dramatically
the framework and the process of decision making. The Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) has exercised increasing influence in certain
specific areas of tax policy development. Much of its influence can be attributed to
the greater exposure that it has had because of instantaneous communication. The
exposure leads to wider participation and engagement in the issues that it raises.
Where once input into OECD policy and its influence was largely the province of
governments and bureaucrats, the position has changed. The public can access
Significant quantities of information pertinent to tax policy making.' They can also
participate in many of the debates that shape the development of OECD policy.
The first part of this article explores the influence of the OECD on aspects of
Australian tax policy development and identifies those areas where improved
communication and information technology have increased that influence. In the
second part, the article explores aspects of the federal/state relationship in
determining tax policy. It examines whether some of the issues that arise in that
relationship could equally be influenced by international approaches taken by
organisations such as the OECD.
Australia and the OEeD
Australia has a medium-sized economy. It had the twelfth largest GDP in the OECD
in 2002, slightly below the Netherlands and Korea.' As a developed country, it has a
sophisticated and complex tax system. The tax policy work of the OECD Committee
on Fiscal Affairs (CFA) is highly relevant to Australia and the Australian Taxation





Office is a regular participant in and contributor to the many committees and
working parties of the CFA. It is interesting to explore different areas of OECD
interest to determine the effect that it has had on Australian tax policy development.
Its influence is not consistent. It is pervasive.
Treaties
There are over 20 different types of tax treaty.' In addition to the wide range of
treaties dealing with individual taxes and individual activities (such as shipping and
aircraft), there are multilateral treaties. Major multilateral treaties such as the General
Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (CAIT) also include clauses affecting taxation.' By far
the most influential, to date, have been the comprehensive bilateral double tax
treaties on income and capital.
The growth in international trade and the lowering of barriers to trade have
increased the importance of international transactions for all countries.' Where trade
barriers can be removed, there will always be a need for taxation to finance
governments. The international economic convergence places strains on domestic tax
systems, which have their own rules specific to their particular policy imperatives.
For international transactions, however, it is important that economic convergence
produces tax rules that do not inhibit increased economic activity.
The principles set out in the OECD Model Tax Convention Oil Income and on Capital
(OECD Model)' seek to:
Clarify, standardize, and conform the fiscal situation of taxpayers who are
engaged in commercial, industrial, financial, or any other activities in other
countries through the application by all countries of common solutions to
identical cases of double taxation.
The idea of model bilateral conventions arose from the work of the League of
Nations. The OECD took on the work carried out since 1921 to produce, in 1963, a
4 Diamond and Diamond, International Tax Treaties ofAll Nations (2000).
5 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Legal1i1rstruments - Results
of the Uruguay Round (1994) vol 1, 33 lLM 1125, 1144. See further <http://www.wto.org>
and JH Jackson, The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic
Relations (2nd ed 1997).
6 For a broader discussion, see R Vann, 'International Aspects of Income Tax' in V
Thuronyi (ed), Tax Law Design and Drafting (1998) vol2, 718.
7 OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Tax Convention on tncome and on Capital (2000).
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draft model convention.' The OECD Model in its current form was adopted in 1977
and is updated regularly.
Australia, along with most countries, uses the OECD Model as the basis for its
international double tax agreements. The importance of the OECD Model is seen in
the fact that most bilateral double tax treaties are not only based on it, but also follow
its pattern and incorporate its main provisions. When the United Nations became
concerned about inequalities in tax negotiations between developed and developing
countries, it used the OECD Model as the basis for its own model treaty.' Where
Australia has incorporated provisions from the UN Model, it was not therefore
required to diverge considerably from the OECD Model.
Australia's double tax treaties become part of domestic tax law under the
International Tax Agreements Act 1953 (Oh). However, the OECD Model is modified to
suit Australia's particular relationships with its trading partners. In particular, those
agreements negotiated with developing countries tend to place more emphasis on
source country taxing rights. Also, until 1997, Australia often included tax sparing
provisions in its agreements with developing countries. Since that date, government
policy has changed and existing tax sparing provisions will not be renewed once they
expire.
The Commentary on the OECD Model has proved influential in Australian judicial
interpretation of its double tax agreements. In the 1990 case of Thief v FCT,IO the Full
High Court considered the meaning of an 'enterprise of one of the contracting states'
under the Swiss double tax agreement. In interpreting the term, the High Court
agreed that there was no settled meaning in Australian law. The High Court turned
to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention), although
Switzerland is not a party, as it was held to express the general principles of
international law. Under Article 32 of the Vienna Convention, the High Court found
that it could have recourse to supplementary means of interpretation, including
preparatory work on the double tax agreement. The High Court then held that the
OECD Model and Commentary fell within this term." This approach was followed
again in Lamesa Holdings BV v FCT.12
8 DECD, Draft Doubte Taxation Convention on Income and Capital (1963).
9 United Nations, United Nations Model Double Taxati011 Conventio,l between Developed and
Developing Countries (1980).
10 (1990) 171 CLR 338.
11 Taxation Ruling TR 2001/13 provides a comprehensive analysis of the views of the ATD
on the interpretation of double tax agreements.
12 (1997)97 ATC4752; (1997) 35ATR 239.
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The DECD Model and its Commentaries are used by the Australian Government and
the judiciary much as they were intended to be. They are a standard form basis for
Australia's double tax agreements and are used in their interpretation. They are
influential in the development of Australia's national tax policy and provide a useful
framework. It would be wrong to see them as providing an obvious constraint, as
Australia has voluntarily adopted the DECD framework. For example, developments
in the DECD Model to deal with treaty shopping have been fairly limited. Australia
has gone beyond the DECD Model using specific anti-treaty shopping provisions, for
instance, in its double tax treaty with the United States.
Although the influence is strong, Australia does not follow its treaty obligations
where it feels that they are counter to national interest. Evidence of this can be seen in
the approach taken by the Australian Government, following the immigration case of
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh. 13 The Court found that there was a
legitimate expectation that the Australian Government intends to abide by its
international treaty obligations unless it expressly states otherwise. The
Administrative Decisions (Effect of International Instruments) Act 1997 (Cth) reversed this
position and removed the application of legitimate expectation in this area. The
Australian Government refused to be constrained in its domestic policy by its treaty
obligations.
Legislation
In areas of legislation and administration designed to protect the fisc, Australia has
followed, voluntarily, internationally accepted norms," particularly those
recommended by the DECD. Australia has used the traditional designation of
taxpayers as resident or non-resident to determine their tax treatment. It has similarly
applied the concept of source to its treatment of income. Income is taxed differently
depending upon whether it arises from a domestic or foreign source. This has, of
course, given rise to different treatment of outward and inward transactions, as these
are subject to taxation in other jurisdictions. Australia's treaty network, based on the
DECD Model, was developed to deal with double taxation and double non-taxation
of income arising in Australia and one or more other jurisdictions.
With the growth of international trade and transactions, the tax .treaty network has
not been sufficient to capture all transactions within the tax net. The Australian
13 (1995)183 CLR 273.
14 For an analysis of these norms see Vann, above n 6, 720 and R Rohatgi, Basic International
Taxation (2002) ch 1.
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system itself, in common with other sophisticated systems, needed to develop a
broader framework of rules. Increasingly, Australia has looked to its fellow DECD
members and agreed DECD guidelines as it has developed its own legislation in
areas affecting international transactions. The focus has been on developing anti-
avoidance rules to ensure that there is little opportunity for taxpayers to take
advantage of double non-taxation rather than on measures to converge Australia's
taxing rules with those of other DECD members.
Australia's transfer pricing rules provide an example of the influence of the DECD.
Designed to prevent profit shifting between jurisdictions to take advantage of a more
favourable tax environment, there were concerns that application of the different
transfer pricing regimes would lead to double taxation, thereby hindering the
expansion of trade. The 1979 DECD Report, Transfer Pricing and Multinational
Enterprises, gave a common definition for the arm's length principle that underlies
most transfer pricing regimes. There was much subsequent argument over the
definition. However, Australia, along with the other DECD members, adopted the
1995 DECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax
Administrations. These have been instrumental in determining the ATD interpretation
of Australia's own transfer pricing legislation. The Commissioner's approach is set
out in a number of detailed rulings.15 They set out the theory behind Australia's
approach to transfer pricing, based closely on the DECD guidelines, before setting
out the steps to determine and document an arm's length price.
Australia has been in the forefront of common practice among DECD member
countries to counter tax avoidance. It implemented legislation covering thin
capitalisation early on to overcome hidden equity capitalisation through excessive
loans.!6 In 2001 it updated this legislation in light of international developments, to
ensure its continued effectiveness.!'
In 1990, Australia followed the example of other DECD members and introduced a
comprehensive accruals taxation system to tax residents on their share of income
derived offshore that was not taxed comparably to similar income in Australia. The
accruals system centred on provisions governing controlled foreign companies and
foreign investment funds. The Canadian tax expert, Professor Brian Arnold, was
commissioned to advise on the draft legislation prior to its implementation, based on
15 See, for example, Taxation Ruling TR 97/20 on the transfer pricing methodologies that
apply to international dealings between separate legal entities and related Taxation
Rulings TR 94/14, TR 98/11 and TR 99/8.
16 CFA, Issues in International Taxation No 2 - Thin Capitalisation (1987).
17 Illcome Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Oh) div 820.
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his experience of similar legislation in Canada and other OECD member countries."
The legislation for controlled foreign companies relied on the tax systems in place in
seven OECD member countries to place them on a list of favoured jurisdictions that
are treated as having comparable tax systems to that in Australia."
In 2000, Australia followed the example of the other member countries of the OECD
(with the exception of the US), and introduced a consumption tax. It followed the
standard structure of consumption taxes elsewhere in the OECD and the systems
operating in Canada and New Zealand, in particular, formed a useful reference point
in the design of the legislation.
Australian tax policy is primarily focused on domestic imperatives. However, when
there are international implications, Australia tends to look to its major OECD
partners, particularly those with similar tax systems, to provide a comparative
perspective." OECD initiatives and guidelines are influential in determining the
shape of the final policy. This is inevitable, given the pressure of globalisation and
the convergence of international tax systems of the major trading nations. The
international constraints on national tax policy tend not to be overt, but set the
framework for policy. Moving outside that framework raises the risks of unintended
and sometimes detrimental consequences that most democratic governments prefer
not to take."
18 B Amold, Report on the Implementation Issues Arising from the Foreign Investment FUlld
Legislation (1992) and the Federal Treasurer, 'Foreign Investment Fund (FIF) Legislation:
Government Response to Consultant's Report' (Press Release, 9 October 1992).
19 Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Oh) reg 152), sch 10.
20 See B Amold, 'The Process of Tax Policy Formulation in Australia, Canada and New
Zealand' (1990) 7 Australian Tax Forum 379 and the major Government sponsored review
by) Ralph, Reuiew of Business Taxation (1999),
<http://www.rbt.treasury.gov.au/publications/paper4/index.htm>.
21 See the discussion in K Messere, Tax Policy in DECD Countries: Choices and Conflicls (1993)
28.
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Tax administration and policy development
It is in the areas of tax administration and policy development that Australia has
been most influenced by the OECD. Largely, this is because it sees itself as a leader in
these areas." This has been most clearly shown in the area of electronic commerce.
Electronic commerce highlighted the gaps in the existing tax rules." Those operating
outside the rules could do so more easily." There were no clear rules governing
electronic commerce and this led to a breakdown in tax sovereignty. The potential
size of the gap from a revenue perspective was significant, given that once a business
sets up a website, it has a potential global customer base. The gaps in the rules were
gaps of omission. However, unlike the non-taxation of capital gains in New Zealand,
the gaps were unintentional. This represented potential revenue leakage and the tax
authorities of the OECD member states were quick to act and Australia was a leading
participant.
They faced two problems. First, commercial transactions are largely carried out by
fictional entities such as companies, trusts and foundations. Fictional entities have
limited physical presence or links with a particular jurisdiction. They may be
incorporated, constituted or settled in one country, yet operate exclusively in another
or several other countries. The special rules that have been devised to allocate taxing
rights are subject to physical connections that do not exist in cyberspace. Where is the
pennanent establishment of a company that operates largely on the Internet? If a
company is a fiction in real-space life, its fictional persona is open to extensive
manipulation in cyberspace life.
Second, they had to allocate the income arising from electronic commerce between
sovereign states. The special rules devised to allocate income are also artificial
constructs. Nations can assert tax sovereignty more easily over an individual who
22 A review of the speeches of the Commissioner of Taxation, Michael Carmody, available
at <http://www.ato.org.au> clearly demonstrates this view. In developing its role in the
area, the ATO also works outside the OECD in regional bodies, such as APEC (Asian·
Pacific Economic Co-operation). See M Carmody, 'International Business Taxation - An
Administrator's Perspective' in R Vann, Taxing International Business: Emerging Trends in
APEC and DECD Economies (1997) 9.
23 FM Homer and J Owens, 'Tax and the Web: New Technology, Old Problems' (1996)
Bulletin of the International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation 516. For a more extensive
analysis of this issue, see D Bentley, 'The ATO, Tax and the Internet: The Emperor's New
Clothes?' (1999) 9 Revenue Law Journal 99.
24 For a general analysis, see L Lessig, Code (1999).
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operates in Cyberspace than over a fictional entity. The individual may escape that
regulation through criminal means: hiding transactions and evading tax. There exists,
nonetheless, a physical link or presence that allows the sovereign to enforce its
regulation. However, because the rules allocating tax sovereignty between different
jurisdictions are artificial, to overcome a dual link or presence, those rules can be
manipulated using electronic transactions.
The OECD called a meeting of its members in 1997. At the meeting it was stated
that"
The challenges posed to tax systems by Internet Electronic Commerce are real
and governments will need to focus on how to address them in a spirit of
collective co-operation. The allocation of taxing rights must be based upon
mutually agreed principles and a common understanding of how these principles
should be applied. Even if such a consensus is achieved, governments may find
that their ability to enforce taxation may be diminished. Without such a
consensus, the Internet and other new communication technologies may pose a
serious challenge to governments in maintaining their revenue bases.
The CFA acted as a catalyst to generate discussion using a multi-disciplinary
approach involving all its Working Parties." Both in the Working Parties and in
wider discussions the CFA included a range of participants outside the member
country delegates, particularly business representatives. The idea was to try and
develop a consensus on solutions that went beyond the OECD member states.
National governments began to issue reports on the taxation of electronic
commerce." The ATO produced two major reports in 1997 and 1999.28 As the country
reports identified the seriousness of the international threat to traditional concepts of
income allocation and tax administration, they looked to increased co-operation to
reach a solution. In October 1998, the OECD Ministerial Conference endorsed a
25 DECD, 'Electronic Commerce: The Challenges to Tax Authorities and Taxpayers', (1997
DEeD), a paper presented at an informal round table discussion between business and
government in Turku, Finland. Available at
< http://www.oecd.org/daf/fa/e_com!e_com.htm>.
26 Homer and Owens, above n 23,523.
27 For example, US, The White House, A Framework for Electronic Commerce (1997), EU, A
European Initiative in Electronic -Commerce (1997), Canadian joint Govemment/Business
report on Electronic Commerce and Canada's Tax Administration (April 1998)
<http://www.rc.gc.calecomm/>.
28 Tax and the Internet and Tax and the Internet: Second Report - December 1999, both available
at <http://www.ata.gov.au>.
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framework for discussion of taxation of electronic commerce." The OECD Taxation
Framework Conditions have been widely accepted. Australia was represented on a
number of the Technical Advisory Groups (TAGs), set up under the Taxation
Framework Conditions. It was also heavily involved in policy development through
the CFA. The Australian Reports closely follow the recommendations of the TAGs at
the time and adopt the Ottawa Taxation Framework Conditions as the basis for the
ATO approach.
In the Second Report, the ATO outlined its agenda. It aimed to use the technologies
underlying electronic commerce to: support the implementation of tax refonn;
improve service to the community; support business on-line; improve the efficiency
of the ATO; and contribute to international best practice in tax administration. These
aims were reflected in the Action Plan 'Service Strategy 5.1 - Improving service
standards'.30 Largely, it has achieved its objectives and remains a leader in this area
within the OECD. Without the electronic platform, the delivery of major tax reform in
2000 and 2001 would have faced serious difficulties.
The TAGs, in which Australia has played a leadership role, have also proved
extremely successful in several areas. There has been an agreed clarification to the
OECD Model interpretation of the definition of pennanent establishment." There has
been a widely accepted report on treaty characterisation issues." A number of other
reports provide steps towards consensus on contentious issues.33
Australia brings its experience in leadership in international policy development to
the Forum for Strategic Management," established under the auspices of the CFA for
senior tax administrators of member states. The ATO has apparently established a
website for the Forum 'where revenue authorities can exchange views on
29 CFA, 'A Borderless World - Realising the Potential of Electronic Commerce' a report
presented on 8 October 1998, (OECD Taxation Framework Conditions) available at
<http://www.oecd.orgldaf/fa/e.com/ottawa.htm>. See also, OECD, Electronic Commerce: A
Discussion Paper on Taxation Issues, a paper presented for discussion at the DEeD
Govemment/Business Dialogue on Taxation and Electronic Commerce held in Hull,
Quebec, Canada, on 7 October 1998.
30 Second Report, above n 28, 13.
31 See <http://www.oecd.orgldaflfa>.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid. See further, OECD Press Release, 12 February 2001, 'DECD Progresses towards
Achieving an International Consensus on the Tax Treatment of E-commerce'.




strategically important tax management issues'." The ATO believes that, 'the
capability to provide ready access to best practice and facilitate virtual interaction...
Are critical enablers for dealing with a dynamic globalising environment'."
Most important for this discussion, The ATO has helped to set the international
policy framework in electronic commerce through its participation in the OECD. As
it grows in its role as one of the influencers of international tax policy, it is inevitable
that Australia will buy into the policy changes put forward by the OECD on a wider
range of issues. As Australia influences the OECD, so the OECD will become a
stronger influence on Australian international tax policy.
OECD influence
The influence of the OECD in tax matters has increased substantially over the years
as it has taken a leading role in developing tax policies to meet the challenges facing
its members. For Australia, it provides an opportunity to participate in international
policy development with the major economic powers. It is inevitable, therefore, if
Australia is to remain a player within the OECD in tax matters, that the Federal
Government will largely conform its international tax policy approach to that of the
OECD.
The success of the OECD Model as a basis for Australian and other countries' double
tax agreements shows that there is much to be gained from policy convergence of this
kind. Implementing agreed OECD policy approaches at a legislative level has also
been successful for Australia. The broad framework within which the OECD operates
allows significant room for national idiosyncrasy. However, the convergence is
sufficient for Australia, for example, to identify companies operating in its major
OECD partners as being comparably taxed under its controlled foreign company
rules, thereby reducing significantly the administrative burden for companies
operating in those jurisdictions. Similar benefits apply in other areas.
Australia's approach to electronic commerce is a useful example of how the OECD
does influence national tax policy. Australia is not in the position of the US or the EU,
where it can dictate international policy. It therefore relies on international fora such
as the OECD as arenas to put forward its ideas. In an area such as electronic
commerce, Australia has recognized that international agreement is essential to
protect both trade and revenue. It is also an area where Australia has a competitive
35 Ibid, para 4.6.4.
36 Ibid.
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advantage. The ATO has capitalized on this opportupity to invest time and resources
in the policy development program within the OECD.
In this way, it can put forward its own ideas and those of its constituents in taking
the policy discussion forward. As a leading member of OECD policy development
teams the ATO achieves an influence far beyond Australia's economic weight.
However, it also has to take considerable ownership of the policies put forward. To
reject them wholly or in large part would likely undermine Australia's credibility and
reduce the ATO's influence in future discussions.
Australia uses the dialogue within the OECD to take forward its own policy agenda
at an international level. By participating, it reduces its facility to act outside the
OECD international tax policy framework. Constraints are inevitable if a country
(particularly an economically small country) wishes to participate fully in
international trade. It is simply the extent to which they apply. The advantage of
voluntarily operating within those constraints is that it provides a greater
opportunity to influence future developments. Australia has chosen the latter course.
Lessons for the federaUstate relationship
Do any of these broader international approaches translate into a federal/state
environment? In many ways the federal/state relationship in most OECD countries
has reached a level of sophisticated convergence that the question should perhaps be
the other way round. However, it is partly because the federal/state relationship has
been in place in many jurisdictions for such a long time that there may be some
innovative ideas that could translate from the international environment to enliven
and enlighten federal/state relationships.
The federal/state relationship depends very much on the model of government
developed in the relevant jurisdiction. In federal systems, there is normally a level of
government below the central government that has power over many of the
functions carried out by the central government in a unitary system. For example,
state or provincial governments" in federal systems may have primary responsibility
for matters such as health and education. This second level of government usually
has many of the features of a central government in a unitary system. In OECD
member countries, this would include a democratic government and the separation
of powers. Tax revenues are as critical to the operation of state governments as they
are to any other form of government exercising national responsibilities.




Australia provides a good example of the tensions that occur where taxing powers
overlap." Section 51(ii) of the Australian Constitution gives concurrent taxing powers
to both the Commonwealth and the states. Historically, the states were more
powerful. Recall that federation only took place in 1901. At that time, with the
introduction of a federal constitution, the states lost their power to levy customs and
excise duties." This increased their reliance on income tax. In 1920, the Ken
Commission made the first attempt at harmonisation. The Commonwealth
Government, meanwhile, was finding the limits on its taxation powers restrictive.
The Ferguson Royal Commission was appointed in 1932. The 1936 Income Tax
Assessment Act was introduced as a result. It provided comprehensive coverage of
income taxation and was introduced in both the Commonwealth and the states.
During World War 11, the federal government introduced a scheme that effectively
prevented the states from imposing income tax. Although challenged as
unconstitutional, it was upheld on two occasions. Agreement was reached on a
sharing of income tax revenue between the Commonwealth and the states. Since
then, the states have never exercised their right to impose income taxation. However,
tensions rose over the years because of the quantum of tax revenues available for
sharing among the states. Various indirect taxes were levied both by the
Commonwealth and the states. Agreement was eventually reached to introduce a
consumption tax (Goods and Services Tax or GST) from 1 July 2000. This required the
abolition of most indirect taxes. In return, the states were given the revenue from the
GST. The sharing formula was contested, but a potentially significant increase in
revenue made agreement achievable.
The Australian example raises a number of issues. It is interesting to note that many
are also reflected internationally. A primary issue is the power to tax. The central
government prefers to retain that power as a measure of control over the economy'"
38 For an overview of the history of taxation in Australia, see C Coleman and M McKerchar,
'The Chicken or the Egg?: A Historical Review of the Influence of Tax Administration on
the Development of Income Tax Law in Australia', paper presented at the Tax History
Conference, 4-5 September 2002, Cambridge, UK; RH Woellner et aI, Australiall Taxa/iDll
Law (12th cd, 2002), ch 1 or JWaincyrner, Ausfralimll"come Tax Prillciples alld Po/icy (1993)
ch3.
39 Section 90 of the Constitution.
40 Although there have long been arguments that economic welfare can increase through
different local tax and public spending regimes. See CM Tiebout, 'A Pure Theory of Local
Expenditures' (1956) 64 Joumal of Political Ecollomy 416. Analyses of the federal/local
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Otherwise, state tax expenditures can increase. State taxation must then increase with
it and the level of concurrent taxation may impede national economic growth.'!
Centralisation of taxing power does not necessarily remove the right to tax using
other types of tax, such as property taxes, levies and charges. However, it does mean
that there must be a reallocation of tax revenue to meet state expenditures. This can
take place through grants or a formulary revenue allocation. Messere points out that
most OECD countries do not consider the funding of expenditure through deficits
legitimate over the long-term." As states impose non-income taxes, levies and
charges, they must be administered and collected efficiently to ensure a stable
revenue base. Therefore, critical to the operation of a federal system is the jurisdiction
to tax and the types of taxes imposed, their efficient administration and collection,
and the allocation of revenues.
Jurisdiction and types of tax
The jurisdiction issue has wider ramifications than simply the state/state and
federal/state relationship matrix. State/other country and state/international investor
relationships are now important. For example, the Australian state of Queensland
may have competing interests (elements of which may be mutually exclusive).
Queensland has to satisfy its relationships with the other Australian states. It also has
to provide incentives to foreign direct investors and remove indirect trade and other
barriers to develop closer ties with regional neighbours. The basic jurisdictional
relationships are usually far stronger than those that are external. But it is the
strength of that commonality that requires the differentiation to allow the states to
compete economically."
States are generally limited in their ability to tax and the types of taxation that they
can use. To compensate, states use other methods of tax. Often the state or local level
tax is disguised as a tariff or other barrier not defined as a tax, such as licence fees
and fuel levies. On the other hand, competition may result in amelioration of taxes
for investors that the state wishes to attract, for example, tax holidays for stamp
duties and land taxes for multinational headquarter companies. Australian states are
tension are found in P Prudhomme, 'The Dangers of Decentralisation' (1995) 10 World
Bank Research Observer 201 and RM Bird, 'Threading the Fiscal Labyrinth - Some Issues in
Fiscal Decentralisation' (1993) 46 National Tax Journal 207.
41 See further the discussion in Messere, above n 21, ch 9.
42 Ibid, 192.
43 For a wider discussion, see 5 Bucovetsky, 'Rent Seeking and Tax Competition' (1995) 58
Journal of Public Economics 337.
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open to negotiation with significant international investors over state taxes and other
imposts.«
Even within a sovereign jurisdiction the principle of comparative advantage remains.
The power to tax is one of the few tools left to government to influence the local
economy. To the extent that the taxing rights rest with an authority, the authority will
do its utmost to preserve its tax autonomy unless there are demonstrable advantages
in doing so. For example, the funding of the states in Australia through the eST was
arguably instrumental in gaining political acceptance for its implementation.
Conversely, when a proposal was put forward to create a uniform stamp duties act
for all Australian states, only some were willing to participate. The rest could not see
the advantage in giving up their autonomy. But this demonstrates the need, where
there is a change in system, to protect the interests of all those affected by the change,
or it will not be accepted. Although, generally, there are constitutional protections to
prevent override by the federal authority, it is the understanding by all parties of the
necessity for a common approach that is a lesson that can be drawn from the work of
theOECD.
The global tax position is similar to the local. There is now a range of relationships at
different levels that affects a country's power to tax. Increasingly, competition limits
the scope of domestic tax policy. The influence of international organisations limits
that scope still further. The international organisations can only do so, however,
because they are seen as relatively impartial and broadly pursuing a common benefit.
Within the federal/state relationship this does not occur, as the federal government is
usually pursuing its own agenda and cannot act as an 'impartial' arbiter or facilitator.
Perhaps an independent policy facilitator could perform that task at the local level as
effectively as the OECD has done internationally? Independent central banks are the
archetype that proves that it is at least feasible.
Administration and collection
States face similar problems federally in administering and collecting taxes, as
countries do internationally. Because of their commonality of interests, there is
usually at least as much co-operation between states as occurs in economic groupings
such as the EO. However, as soon as there is autonomy, there still needs to be
44 China provides another example of negotiation with investors. See, A Shu and JYang,
'China enacts incentives to encourage information technology, innovation and
developments' (2000) 20 Tax Notes III/cmatiollal 829. See also, L Zaheng, L Wang and M
Gould, 'China establishes special trade zones to encourage export operations' (2001) 22
Tax Notes International 589.
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agreement on how co-operation can occur. Where systems and taxes differ, co-
operation can be difficult to achieve. Take, for example, the problems that have arisen
in the US for states attempting to collect taxes in other states. There is the dual
problem of federal and other state concerns over the legitimacy of the taxes and
jurisdiction both to tax and collect taxes." Often, in this situation, there is a federal
override of the states' powers.
It occurred in Australia with the income tax when the Commonwealth effectively
took control of the income tax. It has occurred through the courts in the US, where
the Commerce and Due Process Clauses in the US Constitution have been used by
the Supreme Court to limit the taxing rights of states." The Federal Government in
the US has also used significant influence to pass the Internet Tax Freedom Act." The
Act places a moratorium on Internet taxation until agreement is reached as to what
taxation should occur. For example, it bars state or local governments from taxing
Internet access and from imposing taxes that would subject buyers and sellers of
electronic commerce to taxation in multiple states. The states have been discussing an
appropriate policy approach but failed to reach agreement before the end of the three
year moratorium. President Bush extended the moratorium in 2001. The original
authors of the Internet Tax Freedom Act are intent on introdudng legislation to make
the moratorium permanent." This will effectively limit the states' taxing powers in
the area, largely because they have failed to reach consensus.
Federal intervention does not necessarily solve the difficulties raised through state
tax competition. Pope argues that the major tax reforms in Australia in 2000 have
exacerbated tax competition between states in Australia." This places a heavier
burden on the administration and collection of state taxes.'" However, when it comes
45 These issues are discussed at length in W Hellerstein, 'Roles Of States/Provinces in
Taxation in the CanadafU.5. Context' (2001) 27 Can USLj 75 and W Hellerstein,
'Transaction Taxes and Electronic Commerce: Designing State Taxes That Work in an
Interstate Environment' (1997) L (3) Nalional Tax Iournal 593.
46 For example, Quill Corp v North Dakota 504 US 298 (1992).
47 For a history, the full text, summary and recent developments, see
<http://cox.house.gov/nettax> and [inks. See also, MC McLaugh[in, The Internet Tax
Freedom Act: Congress Takes a Byte Out of the Net' (1998) 48 Catholic University Law
Re"view 209.
48 Ibid.
49 JPope, 'State Tax Competition in Australia: An Applied Perspective', paper presented at
the 12th Tax Research Network Conference, 5-6 September 2002, Cambridge, UK, 21.
50 See generally, N Warren (ed), Slale Taxation, Repeal, Reform or Resignalio" Australian Tax
Research Series No 21.
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to the administrative detail the state revenue authorities appear to be driven by the
practical need to protect the fisc. The close links developed over many years between
different state revenue authorities provide the model to which international
organizations, such as the OECD, aspire for their members. It is in the policy and
legislation governing administration and collection that arguments for an
independent policy fadlitator apply most strongly. However, once such a facilitator
was accepted, it would make sense to extend its terms of reference to cover the
improvement in administration and collection of revenue among the parties. It could
raise the bar for standards of co-operation that could be achieved.
Allocation of revenues
The allocation of revenues among states in a federal system raises the same issues as
allocation of revenues among nations.51 However, the allocation of tax revenues
between different levels of government has been going on longer, there is greater
commonality in most systems and the mechanisms are more sophisticated with better
fadlity for appropriate information sharing. Formulary apportionment in federal
systems is common, whereas it has received limited acceptance in some regional
groupings and is widely rejected at the internationalleve1.52 A different environment
can produce a different perspective. In a federal system, the mechanism for
apportionment is accepted but tensions rise over discussion of the formula. However,
in the end, the ties of nationhood ensure that, in most cases, agreement is reached. As
soon as the relationship between the parties has sufficient investment in it, revenue
sharing becomes possible. The parties cannot afford the relationship to break down
and their links are too close to make a standoff feasible. This is increasingly the case
within the EU for aspects of revenue sharing. However, as the EU Commission and
OECD encourage such allocation at the international level, there is, again, at the state
level, no independent fadlitator. It may be that the tensions at the state level would
be ameliorated by the presence of an independent facilitator in the allocation of
revenues. The negotiation may be no less difficult, but an allocation under the
auspices of an independent facilitator could be seen as fairer than that achieved by
force of necessity.
51 MJ Graetz and MM O'Hear, 'The 'Original Intent' of US International Taxation' 46 Duke
Law /ournaI1021.
52 Messere, above n 21, ch 9; BJM Terra and PJ Watte!, European Tax Law (2nd ed 1997) ch 11;
'EU Commission, Member States Commit to EU-Wide Company Taxation, Formulary
Apportionment' (2001) 26 Tax Notes International 515.
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Lessons from the international environment
It is likely that external pressures will encourage reinforcement of federal/state
commonality, given the clear advantages of free trade and removal of trade barriers
at that level. The challenge will be to determine whether competition or mutual self-
interest will prevail. The latter will allow the joint reduction of internal trade barriers
in the form of taxation or the common use of taxation as a policy tool within a federal
environment, as has increasingly occurred in Australia. Compare the US, where
different state systems still apply and there is nervousness about experimenting with
reform of the tax mix in such a complex economy.53
It is almost inevitable that external competition will continue to encourage
convergence of taxes affecting inter-state trade and transactions, as has happened
with the harmonisation of Australian stamp duty and the US attempt to introduce a
common approach to the taxation of electronic commerce. However, in areas
unaffected by the demands of trade, where there is autonomy, individual systems are
more likely to remain with little federal/state tension, for example, land tax on
residential investment properties.
The lessons from the changing international tax environment appear, in general
terms, to reinforce the long-held views of public finance theorists.54 Jurisdiction to tax
is a legal and political issue. But practically, there is a trend towards centralising
control. The criteria for good state and local taxes focus on lack of mobility of the tax
base. This is evident in the debate over state taxation of electronic commerce. It is also
relevant to the administration and collection of taxes. Increased mobility of taxpayers
and transactions requires the greater levels of co-operation now also being sought at
the international level, or a relinquishing of the administration and collection
function of the taxes with a more mobile tax base, as has occurred in Australia. The
critical factor remaining is the allocation of income between the federal constituents.
In this area, in particular, the federal experience provides a useful model for those
seeking to extend it internationally.
Conversely, in the management of federal/state relationships, the international
experience provides a useful model that could reduce the tensions that often arise.
Independent policy institutions that act as facilitators in the development of policy
53 J Guttentag. 'Emerging Issues in Taxing Business in a Global Economy', in Vann, above
n 17, 67, 75.
54 For example, R Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance (1959); CE McLure (ed), Tax




and administration for their members have been increasingly useful and successful in
specific areas at the international level. Whether federal governments would give up
any element of control to an independent policy facilitator is questionable. However,
given the success of such bodies at the international level it would be an idea worth
exploring to improve revenue policy, legislation and administration within federal
systems.
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